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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examined the effect that governance structures have on corporate 
performance using our newly constructed corporate database for 20th century Japan. We show 
that the ownership structure was an important determinant of corporate performance during the 
interwar period.  Especially, ownership by large shareholders and managerial ownership had a 
significant effect in this period. By contrast, in the high-growth era and after the oil crises, 
ownership structure also influenced corporate performance, but to a much smaller degree than 
in the prewar period. Ownership structure was not an important determinant of corporate 
performance when economy grew rapidly. However, corporate performance grew more 
sensitive to ownership structure in the bubble period (the late 1980s) and after the collapse of 
the bubble, as the negative effects of stable shareholding and shareholding by banks became 
apparent. These Japanese experiences suggest that ownership structure influences corporate 
performance but not necessarily on a consistent basis. 
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1.  Introduction 
The Japanese economy that realized high growth in the twentieth century also experienced a 
variety of dramatic upheavals.  Japan industrialized rapidly since the late 19th century, and 
achieved industrialization of heavy industries during World War I. In turn, Japan suffered from 
perpetual economic crises from the 1920s to the early 1930s, and then operated under wartime 
planned economy from 1937.  The postwar reforms had a wide-ranging impact on the 
Japanese economy.  From 1955 to 1970, Japan enjoyed an unprecedented long-run economic 
boom (during the “high growth era”), and the country became an economic powerhouse.  The 
collapse of the “bubble economy” at the end of the 1980s mired the country in a serious slump 
during the 1990s. 
Much has been written about Japan’s economic performance in the twentieth century 
(Patrick and Rosovsky 1976, Nakamura 1988). However, previous researchers, particularly 
those dealing with the prewar Japanese economy, have used macro-level data, and when they 
have turned to micro-level data, they have usually focused on a limited number of firms in 
specific industries.  Furthermore, there are only a few studies that examine both the prewar 
and postwar Japanese economy from a historical perspective.  And no scholar has used time 
series profitability data, for example.  
On the other hand, there is a growing literature on the evolution of the corporate system in 
20th century Japan (Aoki and Patrick 1994, Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara 1999, Hoshi and 
Kashyap 2001, Morck and Nakamura 2005, Franks, Mayer and Miyajima 2008). The prewar 
corporate system was market- oriented, and different from the postwar corporate system, but 
was transformed under the wartime planned economy and postwar reforms, which established 
a homogenous structure with insider boards, main banks, and stabilized shareholding. In the 
1990s, this unique Japanese type of system underwent further major changes.1  Nontheless 
considerable research has been conducted on the Japanese corporate system, scholars have still 
not fully determined whether and how the corporate system influences corporate performance. 
The ultimate goal of our research is to illuminate the interrelation between corporate 
governance and performance. As we take up this challenge, there is, of course, a long list of 
                                                  
1 On current changes of J-type corporate system, see Dore (2000), Inagami and Whittaker (2005) and 
chapters in Aoki, Jackson and Miyajima (2007).  
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possible issues that could be addressed, ranging from the effect of competition, the role of debt, 
bank intervention, and internal governance to boards of directors and compensation schemes.  
In this paper, we have chosen to focus on ownership structure and its influence on corporate 
performance.  
There were large literatures concerning on the relationship between ownership structure 
and corporate performance.  Since Berle and Means (1932), who focused on the agency 
problem caused by the dispersion of ownership, the view that a dispersed ownership structure 
leads to inferior performance has gained wide support.  However, empirical studies do not 
necessarily support this relationship between ownership structure and performance.  For 
example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) advocated that a particular ownership structure may have 
hardly any affect on corporate performance, because the optimal ownership structure is 
determined through the rational behavior of each economic player.  Albeit this skepticism, 
many subsequent investigations have shed light on the nonlinear relationship between 
ownership structure and corporate performance.  Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) 
indicated that increases in ownership by outside shareholders contribute to enhancing corporate 
performance through monitoring, while extremely strict monitoring by a large shareholder 
might diminish managerial incentives.  Furthermore, Morck, Shliefer and Vishny (1988) 
presented evidence that managerial ownership could mitigate the conflict between shareholders 
and managers (alignment effects), and might interdict monitoring from outside of the firm, 
which would adversely affect performance (entrenchment effects)2.  In addition to these 
topics, the exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in family-owned 
companies or hierarchical organizations has become one of the most spotlighted issues in 
recent years3. 
Analysis of Japanese firms in the 20th century could provide important insights into 
these questions.  As Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (2008) emphasized, the ownership structure 
of Japanese firms in the prewar period had been quite diverse; privately held companies with 
concentrated ownership structures such as zaibatsu-affiliated companies coexisted with public 
                                                  
2 See also McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995) and the excellent survey of this literature by Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001). 
3 Represented works are Classen, Djankow, Fan and Lang (2000), Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
Friedmam (2000), Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung (2005). 
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companies with dispersed ownership structures.  Therefore, prewar Japanese firms with their 
diversified ownership structures provide a desirable sample for analyzing the relationship 
between ownership structure and corporate performance.  In addition, postwar Japanese firms, 
which have been characterized by a less concentrated ownership structure and the importance 
of banks and corporations as shareholders, are a useful sample for estimating the effects of 
managerial entrenchment and the exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders. 
Furthermore, previous research in this area has employed methods of short-term 
analysis, and has not investigated how dynamic factors such as the business cycle or long-term 
economic development have determined the corporate ownership structures that are adopted.  
The analysis of this paper aims to shed light on the relationship between ownership structure 
and corporate performance in large Japanese firms from a historical perspective. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we briefly describe our original 
database and illustrate the long-term transition in the performance of large Japanese firms. 
Although many researchers have constructed macroeconomic indicators for prewar Japan since 
Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), firm-level indicators have not been established yet.  Therefore, 
this section can be seen as a pioneering effort in this field.  
Section 3 provides stylized facts concerning the evolution of the ownership structure of 
Japanese firms. Much has been written on the ownership structure of Japanese firms in the 
postwar period (Aoki 1988, Odagiri 1992, Sheard 1994, Hoshi and Kashyap 2001, Miyajima 
and Kuroki 2007), while the fundamental facts about the ownership structure in the prewar 
period have not become widely studied4.  Based on Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (2008) 
recent work, and combining with our own data, we present the long-term evolution in the 
ownership of Japanese firms throughout the 20th century. 
Section 4 and 5 provide econometric analysis of the relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate performance for the prewar and postwar periods respectively.  In the 
literature of Japanese economic history, as for the prewar period, the effects of zaibatsu 
affiliation have received previous attention5, so our analysis will focus on the different effects 
                                                  
4 Morck and Nakamura (2005) is one of the few studies into this area of inquiry. 
5 Frankl (1999) and Okazaki (2001) examine the function of zaibatsu, using firm-level micro data. 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2009-001? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
 
 - 4 -
of shareholding by managers and large shareholders including holding companies.  On the 
other hand, as for the postwar period, we will clarify that stable shareholders have no positive 
effects on corporate performance, that shareholding by banks has had different effects over 
time, and that shareholding by corporations has had a constantly positive effect on corporate 
performance until the 1990s. All of our results raise questions regarding the findings of 
previous research into the roles of the various types of shareholders described above6.  
Section 6 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Corporate Performance in 20th-Century Japan 
2.1? Data 
Let us begin by providing an overview of the long-term transition of corporate performance in 
20th-century Japan.  Focusing mainly on profitability as a corporate performance indicator, we 
adopt ROA (operating profits divided by total assets) as the most comprehensive measure of 
capital efficiency, but for the prewar period, also employ ROE (after-tax profits divided by 
equity)7.  In addition to these profitability measures, we also employ a growth measure, the 
growth rate of total assets, because there is a possible trade-off between short-term profitability 
and long-term corporate growth. 
Attempts to illustrate corporate performance over a century create difficulties with 
sample selection. We treat this problem by using three different datasets, displayed in Table 1. 
   ------------------------------------------------- 
    INSERT Table 1 ABOUT HERE 
   ------------------------------------------------- 
The first dataset covers the period from 1914 to 1942, and consists of the 200 largest 
manufacturing firms (asset-base) for at least one of the following years -- 1918, 1930 and 1937, 
with all the necessary data items8.  This dataset is an unbalanced panel, which encompasses 
both entries to and exits from the market.  We acquired the necessary data from “Kabushiki 
Gaisha Nenkan” by Toyo Keizai Inc., “Honpo Jigyo Seiseki Bunseki” by the Mitsubishi 
                                                  
6 Porter (1992), Lichtenburg and Pushner (1994) and Yafeh and Yosha (2003) stress its positive effects, 
while Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000), Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani 
(2000) stress its negative effect. 
7 This is because the financial accounting system in Japan was disseminated inadequately in the prewar 
period and desirable data such as operating profits, ordinary profits, and value added are not available. 
8 We constructed the list of the largest firms from Appendix A-1 and A-2 in Fruin (1992) for 1918 and 
1930, and “Honpo Jigyo Seiseki Bunseki” for 1937. 
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Economic Research Institute, and other sources.  The number of sample firms reached 67 for 
1915, 102 for 1920, 206 for 1930, and 193 for 1940.  The financial accounting system in 
Japan was inadequately disseminated in the prewar period, and financial statements of sample 
firms did not follow a single format, so we made adjustments in the interests of uniformity as 
much as we could. 
The second dataset covers the 1950s and 1960s, the period just after the postwar 
reforms, and is used to bridge the prewar and the postwar periods.  This dataset is composed 
of 126 firms that are ranked among the 100 largest firms (asset-base) for either 1937 or 1955, 
or in both years, with all the necessary data items.  The number of the sample firms decreases 
gradually as they exit from the market.  We obtained the necessary data from “Jojo Gaisha 
Soran” by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
The third dataset mainly covers the period from 1956, and consists of 353 large 
manufacturing firms whose sales in 1990 were more than 50 billion yen.  This dataset is an 
unbalanced panel which includes only entries of the sample firms to the market.  The data 
used to construct this dataset was taken from “Corporate Finance Data” by the Development 
Bank of Japan and “Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS)” by Nikkei Inc. 
 
2.2? Stylizing Fact on Corporate Performance 
Figure 1 shows the average and standard deviation of ROE calculated using the newly 
constructed database.  Figure 2 provides the ROA for the postwar period, and Figure 3 
provides the growth rate of assets from 1916 to 1998.  Since ROE and the growth rate of total 
assets are sometimes extremely volatile, we adopted a three-year moving average of those 
indexes after eliminating the outliers, which we defined as varying from the average by three 
standard deviations. 
------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT Figure 1, 2, 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------- 
From these figures, which are initial attempts to reveal long-term trends in the 
corporate performance of large Japanese firms with cross-sectional diversity, we can observe 
the following facts. 
(1) After enjoying an unprecedented booming economy from World War I, Japanese firms 
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experienced dismal performance from 1920 to 1932, when the standard deviation of ROE 
commonly surpassed the average.  The growth rate of total assets also indicates a similar 
tendency.  From the postwar depression in 1920 to the Showa depression (1929-1932), 
Japanese firms exhibited both low profitability, and immense variance among firms.  By 
contrast, however, since 1933, when the economic recovery was observed, both ROE and the 
growth rate of total assets rose sharply and their standard deviations contracted simultaneously. 
(2) The corporate performance of Japanese firms in the wartime period (1938-1942) is 
characterized by relatively high rates of profitability with less volatility.  Under wartime 
planned economy, where macroeconomic conditions were marked by excess demand and 
resource constraints, government suppressed the high profits of the armaments industry while 
ensuring a certain level of profits for constrained, civilian industries.  In the early 1950s, 
following the postwar reform and return to the market economy, Japanese firms had high but 
volatile rates of profitability because of unexpected factors such as the need for corporate 
reconstruction and reorganization9, special procurements during the Korean War, and the 
subsequent slowdown following the armistice. 
(3) In the high-growth era (1955-1970), Japanese firms exhibited both quite high 
profitability and growth; ROA on average varied from 8 to 13 percent, whereas the growth rate 
of total assets exhibited from 15 to 20persent.  As for ROE, the only indicator that covers 
both the prewar and postwar periods, the average for the high-growth era exceeds the peak in 
the prewar period (1934-1936).  In addition, one of the most distinctive characteristics for the 
high-growth era is the extremely small variance in all indicators such as ROA, ROE, and the 
growth rate of assets. For instance, the coefficient of variation (standard deviation / average) of 
ROE for this period was 0.83, and that of the growth rate of total assets was 0.70.  High 
economic growth meant high profitability and high growth rates for many Japanese firms. 
(4)  From 1974 to 1990, the period that follows the 1973 oil shock and includes the 
“bubble” economy of the late 1980s, the ROA of sample firms declined continuously through 
several business cycles.  The ROA on average remained at low levels even during the 
economic boom and “bubble” of the 1980s, and this trend is also true of ROE.  We should 
                                                  
9 The abrupt declines of ROE and ROA in the early 1950s can be attributed in part to the revaluation of 
fixed assets and the capitalization of ensuing revaluation profits, which increased total assets and equity. 
For more on this topic, see Miyajima (2004). 
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observe that disparities in firm performance, especially in the case of ROE, surged just after 
the first oil shock but have remained at a low level ever since.  On the other hand, the growth 
rate of assets rose to a peak of 12 percent in 1989.  In summary, during the “bubble” period, 
corporate investments reached high levels in spite of low profitability. 
(5) In the 1990s after the burst of the “bubble” economy, all performance indicators 
remained at low levels except during the temporary recovery in 1995 and 1996.  The great 
disparity in corporate performance among sample firms is another feature observed for the 
period, and widened further from 1997, when the banking crisis occurred.  As described 
above, the corporate performance of Japanese firms in the late 1990s is characterized by 
extremely low profitability and growing disparity among firms. 
 
3.  Evolution of Corporate Ownership in Japan 
Table 2 shows C3, the percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders of the sample 
firms from 1907 to 2000, based on Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (2008).  The sample includes 
firms, which were incorporated before 1920, and had survived until 2000.  The numbers of 
sample firms are 45 with the exception of 38 in 1907.  In addition, Figure 4 shows the 
ownership structure in terms of types of shareholders, based on the postwar sample (see Table 
1).  We could summarize the evolution of the ownership structure of Japanese firms in the 
20th century as follows. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT Table 2 & Figure 4 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Prewar: Coexistence of Different Ownership Structures 
The ownership structure in the prewar period was characterized by the following 
features.  First, as Miyajima (2004) pointed out, firms with highly concentrated ownership 
structures coexisted alongside those with widely dispersed structures.  The standard deviation 
of C3 for 1921 is 25 percent, while the average of the sample is 29 percent.  Large Japanese 
firms in those days had extremely diverse ownership structures. Some private companies were 
held by founder families or holding companies such as Mitsubishi Shipyards (C3 = 98.9%, 20 
shareholders), and Sumitomo Electric Wire (C3 = 97.6%, 21 shareholders) and provided a 
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contrast to publicly-traded companies with dispersed ownership structures such as Toyo 
Spinning (C3 = 6.2%, 10,236 shareholders) and Dainihon Sugar (C3 = 3.9%, 8,442 
shareholders).  
Second, the ownership structure in the interwar period was stable.  C3 in 1937 was 
25.9 percent, varying little from the data recorded for 1921.  Deconcentration of ownership 
proceeded through public offerings of shares by zaibatsu-affiliated companies mainly in the 
1930s, but this had only a limited effect on reducing disparity of ownership structures, which 
remained quite diverse even in 1937.   
Third, however, the ownership structures of large Japanese firms in the prewar era were 
less concentrated than those of U.K. or Germany in the first half of the 20th century, although 
privately held zaibatsu-affiliated companies with highly concentrated ownership structures 
occupied a predominant position in Japan.  Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2008) report that the C3 
of large corporations in the U.K. in 1920 was 35.9 percent, and 31.0 percent even in 1950.  
Franks, Mayer and Wagner (2006) indicate that the C3 of large German companies climbed 
from 58 percent in 1920 to over 60 percent in the 1950s.  Even in the 1990s, according to 
Becht and Mayer (2001) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), the proportion of 
the shares held by the three largest shareholders exceeded 50 percent for large companies on 
the European continent.  Therefore, the ownership structure for at least a portion of prewar 
Japanese firms was less concentrated than the international standard for that period, or even in 
recent years. 
 
Wartime Economy and Postwar Reforms: Shift toward a Homogenous Structure 
The postwar reforms homogenized the diverse ownership structures of the prewar period 
(Miyajima 1994, 2004).  Under wartime controls, shareholders rights were severely restricted 
by the restriction on the dividend payout of firms and the suspension of the decision of general 
shareholder meeting.  During the war, however, the ownership structure of Japanese firms was 
relatively stable because of the controls imposed on bank lending, the stock market, and other 
parts of the economy.  This structure was decisively changed through a series of postwar 
reforms implemented by GHQ to “Americanize” Japan’s economic system.  With the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu, holding companies, zaibatsu families, or zaibatsu-affiliated 
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companies were forced to transfer shares they possessed to the Holding Company Liquidation 
Committee (HCLC), and those shares were sold preferentially to individual shareholders 
including employees.10  In addition, shareholding by individuals was encouraged as firms 
increased their capital in conjunction with corporate reconstruction and reorganization 
initiatives, bringing drastic changes to the ownership structure.  Table 2 shows that the average 
of C3 was 8.3 percent in 1950, and the standard deviation remained at the extremely low level of 
7.3 percent.  In the case of Mitsui Mining, which had a highly concentrated ownership 
structure in the prewar period, C3 was 7.2 percent, and there were 37,050 shareholders in 1950. 
Thus, the ownership structure became not only fully dispersed but also homogenous under the 
postwar reforms. 
 
High Growth Era: Presence of Insider Shareholdings 
The ownership structure, which was fully-dispersed just after the postwar reforms, 
gradually grew more concentrated through the 1950s and 1960s, with C3 reaching 19 percent by 
1970 and remaining at that level subsequently.  On the other hand, the standard deviation of C3 
further declined from the 1970s.  Nonetheless, the striking feature that we should note is the 
change in the composition of shareholders rather than on the change in the degree of 
concentration.  Figure 4 shows the proportion of the shares held by banks, corporations, and 
the total sum of these two components and insurance companies and managers (hereinafter, γ) 
for postwar sample firms.11  The figure illustrates that the proportion of shares held by stable 
shareholders rose from 34.3 percent in 1956 to 62.5 percent in 1974 and has remained at that 
level subsequently.  Ironically, in the postwar era, when the minority shareholder protection 
was strengthened by GHQ initiatives, the majority of shareholders shifted from outside 
investors (individuals and investment trusts) to shareholders who were favorably disposed 
toward the incumbent management (banks and corporations)12.  The ownership structure of 
                                                  
10 In detail, see Miyajima 1994, Morck and Nakamura (2005), and Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (2008). 
11 “Stable shareholders” (γ) in Figure 4 represents the percentage of shares held by banks and 
corporations, plus shares held by managers, minus the percentage held by trust banks ranked among the 
top 10 shareholders of each firm, based on information on ownership structure provided in the financial 
statement of each firm. 
12 Franks, Mayer and Miyajima (2008) offered the magnitude of these legal reforms, using La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). 
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Japanese firms from the 1970s to the early 1990s, in terms of not only C3 but also the 
composition of types of shareholders, had been extremely stable as many previous studies point 
out (Prowse 1992, Flath 1993, Yafeh and Yosha 2003).  From the late 1980s, just after the 
enforcement of the amendment to the Anti-Monopoly Law in 1978, where the limit on the 
proportion of the shares that could be held by single bank was reduced from 10 percent to 5 
percent, the total proportion of shareholdings by banks slightly increased, as shown in Figure 4. 
The ownership structure of Japanese firms changed drastically in the 1990s as the 
proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders gradually began to increase from early in that 
decade. In addition, ignited by the banking crisis in 1997, the unwinding of cross-shareholdings 
and the decrease in stable shareholders began, resulting in an increasingly diverse ownership 
structure for Japanese firms13. 
 
Focus of Analysis 
Our fact finding on the corporate performance of Japanese firms described in the previous 
section and on the ownership structure in this section leads us to the following research agenda:  
1) In the prewar period, under the multimodal ownership structure, profitability varied greatly 
among firms.  We seek to explain whether the ownership structure of Japanese firms affected 
corporate performance. 
2) The appearance of high and less diverse rates of profitability in the high-growth era 
corresponded with the increase in shares held by stable shareholders.  We seek to determine 
whether stable shareholders influenced corporate performance. 
3)  Under the stable ownership structure that has prevailed since the 1970s, the profitability of 
Japanese firms trended downward, and there was little variance among firms. We seek to 
examine whether a relationship between stable shareholders and low profitability exists. 
Given this agenda, we attempt to implement econometric estimations of the relationship 
between ownership structure and corporate performance in section 4 and 5. 
 
 
                                                  
13 See Miyajima, Haramura and Enami (2003) for changes in ownership structure in the 1990s, and see 
Miyajima and Kuroki (2007) for the unwinding of cross-shareholdings. 
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4.  Interwar Period?Effects of Large Shareholders and Managerial Ownership 
4.1  Models and Variables 
As is well known, the interwar Japanese economy had experienced repeated depressions since 
the panic in 1920.  Japanese firms in the heavy industry sector that had been established 
during the World War I faced severe competition from foreign rivals by the time of when the 
switch from the gold standard to the controlled currency system in 1932.  Carefully 
considering on such economic environment of the interwar period, we need to evaluate the 
effects of ownership structure on corporate performance. To approach this issue, we estimate 
the following equation: 
 
P?ROE, ?A?? ?? F? (X1,? X2,? X3,? X4) ? ? ? ? ? ? (1) 
 
where dependent variables is performance, P.  We take the rate of return on equity, ROE ,and 
the growth rate of total assets,?A.  For X1, the macroeconomic factor, we employ the growth 
rate of real GDP.  X2 represents industry specific factors, which consist of three variables.  
First is the growth rate of sales of industry, ?S, which controls for demand effects.  We use 
the median of the growth rate of sample firms calculated separately for 12 industries for 
estimating the ?S.  Second, we use the percentage change of the price level of the industry, 
?P.14  This could be expected to capture the competitiveness of the environment faced by 
each industry.  Third, we employ industry dummy variables, with which we examine the 
industry-specific effects which could not be attributed to changes in demand or price.  X3, is 
the variable related to the firm characteristics. The firm size which is measured by logarithm of 
asset , SIZE, is employed to control for the effects of economies of scale. We also introduce the 
debt assets ratio (DA) into the estimation for controlling for the effects of the capital structure 
on corporate performance. 15  Last variable X4 is variables representing the corporate 
governance structure.  In addition to the ownership structure, we introduce the dummy 
variable OLD, which is equal to 1 if the firm is zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo) 
                                                  
14 We obtained the necessary data from Ohkawa, Kazushi. et al. eds. Estimates of Long-term Economic 
Statistics of Japan since 1868: 8, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1967. 
15 The debt-asset ratio might have an endogeneity problem with performance variables, so we also 
estimate the equation without DA, and obtain similar results.  Therefore we report our results without 
DA below. 
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affiliated, to control for the effects of the internal capital markets of the major corporate 
groups16. 
 
4.2  Basic Estimation 
Table 3 shows the results of the basic estimation, that is, equation (1) without X4.  The 
corporate performance of interwar Japanese firms was strongly influenced by industry-specific 
factors reflected in demand or price, as well as macroeconomic factors such as the growth rate 
of real GDP or the year dummy.  For instance, as the growth rate of sales of the industry 
increases by one standard deviation (12.0 percent), ROE rises by 1.7 percentage points, which 
accounts for about 24 percent of the average ROE (7.1 percent).  The effects of other 
variables such as the price level or industry specific factors also had a considerable effect on 
corporate performance. 
------------------------------------------------- 
    INSERT Table 3 ABOUT HERE 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
In addition, corporate performance in the interwar period exhibits a negative correlation 
with the debt asset ratio, and a positive correlation with firm size.  The effect of firm size is 
noteworthy especially for the 1920s (column 2), suggesting that the economies of scale has 
significantly worked well.  Previous studies noted “the dualistic structure,” that is the 
co-existence of the high-productivity large-scale corporate sector and the low-productivity 
small business sector (Nakamura and Odaka 1988).  The performance difference by size was 
also demonstrated even in the large-scale corporate sector. 
 
4.3  Effects of Ownership Structure: Double-sided Effect 
Table 4 shows the estimation results including ownership structure variables.  α denotes the 
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder excluding managerial ownership.17  In 
other words, α is the proportion of shares held by the largest outside shareholder (individual, 
holding company, or other company).  In addition, we introduce the square of α (α2) to 
capture the nonlinear relationship between large shareholders and firm performance pointed 
                                                  
16 On the role of zaibatsu in prewar period, see Morikawa (1992), and Morck and Nakamura (2005). 
17 When the manager is the largest shareholder, we adopt the second-largest shareholder as the 
variableα. 
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out by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), that occurs when excessive monitoring causes a 
decrease in performance due to a decrease in managerial discretion.  α's average for the 
estimation period is 21.3 percent and its standard deviation is 24.3 percent.  In confirming the 
largest shareholder for 65 sample firms in 1921, we found that an individual was the largest 
shareholder for 33 firms, and out of which, 11 cases was a wealthy individual, and 15 cases 
was the asset management company of an individual (or manager).  The rest of 32 firms was 
the case that the legal entity such as holding company (ex. Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo 
Limited partnership) and other corporation (Hitachi is held by Kuhara Mining) was the largest 
shareholder.  The latter case increased through financial panic in 1927 and Showa Panic 
(1929-31), and as a result, firms with other corporation as the largest shareholder were 42 cases 
out of 67 in 1937.  Out of which, the case that holding company is the largest shareholder is 
15 case, other corporation is 18 case, and other financial institution are 9 cases.  The case that 
bank occupied the largest shareholder was quite limited, just five cases.  
ω denotes the proportion of the shares held by the manager (CEO).  As mentioned 
previously, entrepreneurial firms accounted for a large proportion of major firms in prewar 
Japan. Shitagau Noguchi of Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer Company and Kojiro Matsukata of 
Kawasaki Shipyard Company are typical examples of entrepreneurs who were also the largest 
shareholders of their firms18.  Further there were ineligible cases that professional managers 
were able to purchase their firm’s shares by using their large bonuses.  Sanji Muto of 
Kanegafuchi Spinning Company is a typical example of a professional manager who became 
the largest shareholder of his firm19.  
As pointed out by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes 
(1990), managerial ownership has two conflicting effects on firm performance. While the 
alignment effect mitigates conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, the 
entrenchment effect shields management from meddling by outsiders.  To capture these 
conflicting effects, we introduce ω2 (the square of ω) to the estimation model as well as α. 
------------------------------------------------- 
    INSERT Table 4 ABOUT HERE 
                                                  
18 The proportions of shares held by Noguchi and Matsukata were 18.9 and 16.5 percent respectively in 
1921. 
19 The proportion of shares held by Muto was 1.5 percent in 1921. 
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     ------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 summarizes the estimation results of a regression that assesses ROE by corporate 
governance variables.  First, the coefficient of OLD for the large corporate groups with 
internal capital markets was not significant for almost all estimations with ROE and the asset 
growth rate(?A) as dependent variables.20  As for the mining and manufacturing industries 
that are the focus of analysis of this paper, we could not obtain results that indicate that 
zaibatsu affiliation contributes to firm performance, though caution should be exercised in 
interpreting the results because the estimation results may have been influenced by definitions 
of the zaibatsu. 
Second, the coefficient of α is significantly positive in the 1921-37 period (column 1).?  
After controlling for industry-specific factors and firm size, a high α still contributes to ROE 
through improvement in managerial effort via monitoring by outside shareholders.  Moreover, 
in the model introducing the square of α, α2 is significantly negative at the 1 percent level 
(column 3).  This result indicates that there is a nonlinear relationship between ROE and 
shareholding by large outside shareholders.  The estimated threshold is approximately 62 
percent.21 The ownership of the largest outside shareholder has a positive effect on ROE until 
α attains the threshold.  Beyond this threshold, the increasing shareholding of the largest 
shareholder associated with the declining ROE.  It is important to note a rationale concerning 
why the effect of large outside shareholders turns negative beyond the threshold (62 percent).  
The threshold exists because there is a combined effect of two factors: (a) a monitoring effect 
under very large outside shareholders; and (b) an initiative-lowering effect on managers 
beholden to very large outside shareholders.   
Third, large outside shareholders were composed of not only individual shareholders but 
also holding companies, nonfinancial companies, and the institutional investors 22  (life 
                                                  
20 This result is consistent with Kahnna and Yafeh (2007), Frankl (1999) and inconsistent with Okazaki 
(2001), which concludes that zaibatsu affiliation contributes to firm performance. Okazaki’s sample 
includes non-manufacturing industries, and it defines zaibatsu as those firms which appear on the list of 
the ten largest zaibatsu compiled by GHQ. These differences in samples and definition of zaibatsu might 
explain the estimation differences between our results and Okazaki (2001). 
21 The number of firms with α higher than the threshold was 11 (6.8 percent of the total) in 1928. 
22 During the prewar period, cases in which banks exerted influence on corporate management as a 
large shareholder are limited to those in which banks became large shareholders temporarily through 
debt-equity swaps to rescue financially distressed firms.  Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co., Kobe Steel, Ltd 
and Teikoku Synthetic Fiber are typical examples. 
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insurance companies).  Corporate shareholders such as holding companies and parent 
companies usually have significant monitoring capabilities and hence are effective in 
mitigating agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny 1986).  To test this relationship, we divide α 
into Corp-α to denote that the largest outside shareholder is a corporation and Ind-α to denote 
that the largest outside shareholder is an individual, and then we estimate the model including 
both variables.  We found that the coefficient of Ind-α is not significant while the coefficient 
of Corp-α is significantly positive (column 5).  This result indicates that outside corporations, 
but not outside individuals, played an important role in corporate monitoring during the prewar 
period when they were the largest shareholder. 
Fourth, as for the effect of managerial ownership, the proportion of the shares held by 
managers (ω) is significantly positive and the square of ω (ω2) is significantly negative 
(column 3). Similar to the empirical results of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny?1988? and 
McConnell and Servaes?1990?23, our results also indicate that there is a nonlinear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance during the prewar period.  Here, the 
estimated threshold of ω is approximately 31 percent24.  In other words, the curve, describing 
the relationship between ω and firm performance increases until managerial ownership reaches 
the threshold (31 percent), and then decreases after exceeding the threshold.  This means that 
the alignment effect to mitigate the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders is 
dominant at the left of threshold, though the entrenchment effect that causes performance to 
deteriorate is dominant to the right of threshold.  
Fifth, these nonlinear effects with respect to α and ω are similarly confirmed even if the 
dependent variable is changed from ROE to asset growth rates (columns 4 and 6).  These 
results are consistent with the understanding that monitoring by large outside shareholders 
disciplined managers and encouraged appropriate levels of investment and especially with the 
view that managerial ownership promoted aggressive investment behavior by managers. 
Last, if we divide the estimation period into a recession sub-period (1921-32) and 
economic recovery sub-period (1928-1937), the effects of α and ω are clearly confirmed in the 
economic recovery phase (column 7-10).  As for ω and ω2, while their coefficients are not 
                                                  
23 They use Tobin’s q as a proxy for corporate performance. 
24 The number of the firms with ω values higher than the threshold was 10 (6.2 percent of the total) in 
1928. 
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significant in both ROE and ?A estimations during the 1921-1932 sub-period, they are 
significant in both estimations at the 1 percent level respectively during the 1928-1937 
sub-period.  This indicates that corporate performance became more sensitive to ω during the 
economic recovery sub-period.  Hence, managerial ownership plays a significant role 
especially when business opportunities expand.  This result systematically supports the well 
known anecdotal story that the entrepreneurs at high-tech industries such as Ayukawa (Nissan), 
Mori (chemicals aluminum), and Noguchi (fertilizers and synthetic fiber) took aggressive 
investment policy and showed high performance.25 
 
5.  The Latter Half of the Twentieth Century: Effects of Insider Ownership 
5.1.  Selection of Estimation Periods 
As mentioned previously, the issues that we have to address with respect to the latter 
half of the twentieth century are as follows. 
(1) During the high-growth era, Japanese firms were highly profitable with less 
variability in profitability among firms, and there was an increase in stable shareholders.  We 
focus on whether stable shareholders influenced corporate performance. 
(2) Under the stable ownership structure since the 1970s, the profitability of Japanese 
firms continuously declined, narrowing the variability among firms.  We seek to examine 
whether there is relationship between stable shareholders and low profitability.  
To address these issues, we employ an estimation model similar to the one used in the 
previous section.  Here, as seen in section 3, a large-scale shift in the ownership structure 
from individuals to financial institutions and nonfinancial corporations occurred in the 
high-growth era.  Therefore, the estimation that aims to address the issue raised in (1) above 
confronts a serious endogeneity problem.  To handle this problem, for the high growth era, 
we focus on the first half of the 1960s (1960-64) when ownership structures were relatively 
stable.  As shown in Figure 4, the proportion of shares held by stable shareholders barely 
changed from 1959 (43.8 percent) to 1964 (42.4 percent).  We examine whether the 
ownership structure of 1959 influenced the corporate performance during the five years that 
followed (1960-1964). This period includes two booms -- the “Iwato boom” and the “Olympic 
                                                  
25 See Udagawa (1984), and Morck and Nakamura (2005). 
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boom”, and in addition, Japan lifted trade controls in 1960 and gradually shifted to an open 
economy. On the other hand, as for the stable growth era after oil crises, the endogeneity 
problem is relatively small because ownership structures are stable. Consequently, we focus on 
the period after the first oil shock (1975-1979), the bubble economy period (1985-1989) and 
the period after the collapse of the bubble economy (1990-1994).  Thus, we regress the 
performance for the five years in each period on the ownership structure existing in 1959, 1974, 
1984, and 1989 respectively. 
 
5.2.  Basic Estimation 
First, we examine the estimation results of the model which excludes variables for the 
ownership structure. As the dependent variable, we employ ROA that is the most 
comprehensive index for measuring capital efficiency.  In this section, we use postwar 
samples (see Table 1).  Table 5 shows the estimation results.   
------------------------------------------------- 
    INSERT Table 5 ABOUT HERE 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
First, the performance of Japanese firms is not sensitive to ?P (relative prices) until the 
end of the 1980s.  Even when prices rise sharply after the oil crises, the sign of ?P  is 
negative.  This trend is similar to that of the high-growth era and the bubble-economy period, 
and to the period following the collapse of the bubble economy, and though the sign of ?P  
turns positive, the coefficient of ?P is still insignificant.  Unlike the results for the prewar 
period, prices were not a key determinant of corporate performance in the postwar period.  In 
contrast, the coefficient of ?S (sales growth rate by industry) is positive at the 1 percent 
significance level in each period and its numerical value is also large.  For instance, in the 
high-growth era, as ?S increases by one standard deviation (8.5 percent), ROA rises by 1 
percentage point.  Its magnitude is equivalent to 10 percent or more of average ROA (9.4 
percent) at the time.  After the oil crises, though the magnitude of ?S ‘s influence on 
corporate performance decreases by 0.6 percent, its relative magnitude is comparable when 
considered in light of average ROA (6.6 percent).  In addition, its magnitudes in the bubble 
economy period and after the collapse of the bubble economy are 0.8 and 0.5 percent 
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respectively, which correspond to 10 to 15 percent of ROA in each period.  Corporate 
performance is sensitive to fluctuations in demand, although not to the extent that it was in the 
prewar period.   
On the other hand, eight industry dummy variables out of eleven are significant at the 10 
percent level after the oil crises.  This result is consistent with the commonly accepted 
understanding that the oil crises had a negative effect on labor-intensive industries and 
oil-consuming industries due to steep rises in material prices and unit labor costs.  Moreover, 
since the coefficients of eight industry dummy variables are significant in both the high-growth 
era and bubble period, we can conclude that the performance of Japanese firms was influenced 
greatly by the characteristics of industries to which they belonged until the bubble period.  
Meanwhile, after the bubble period, only three industry dummy variables were significant, and 
thereby factors other than industry-specific effects rose in importance as key determinants of 
corporate performance. 
In sum, corporate performance is not determined not the relative price, but determined 
by the demand and technological factors that is unique to industry. 
Looking at firm specific factors, the debt asset ratio was significantly negative. More 
interestingly, firm size is a significantly negative factor until the oil crises period, an indication 
that small firms achieved a higher level of performance than large firms, a contrast to the trend 
in the prewar period.  However, since the Japanese economy reached maturity in the 1980s, 
the coefficient of firm size turned insignificant, though the sign of the coefficient became 
negative; in short, the relationship between firm size and corporate performance disappeared. 
 
5.3.  Effects of Ownership Structure: From Neutrality to Entrenchment 
As mentioned above, Japanese firms had experienced a compulsory redistribution of 
ownership due to the postwar reforms, so in the postwar ownership structure banks with close 
ties to the client firm, financial institutions, and nonfinancial companies had emerged as major 
shareholders, while the concentration ratio of ownership was remarkably low.  In the following 
analysis, as variables related to the ownership structure (X4 in formulation (1)), we focus on 
shares held by insiders (hereinafter, γ) that includes banks, insurance companies, nonfinancial 
companies, and managers; shares held by banks (hereinafter, BSH); and shares held by the main 
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bank (hereinafter, MBSH). The dummy variable becomes one if the shares held by nonfinancial 
companies exceeds 15 percent26 (hereinafter, PARENT).  γ denotes shares held by shareholders 
who have a friendly relationship with incumbent managers.  Therefore, we can assume that γ 
denotes the stable shareholder ownership ratio.  As for the trends of γ and BSH, they are 
summarized in Table 6.  As for the other variables, MBSH was 2.9 percent in 1959, 5.1 percent 
in 1974, 4.4 percent in 1984, and 4.0 percent in 1989.  In addition, as for the dummy variable 
PARENT, which was given one if other non-financial company held over 15 percent of their 
shares, the number of firms that is eligible to this criteria is 10 percent among sample firms in 
1959, and 25 percent in 1974.  
Two conflicting views have been put forth to explain the effects of the unique features of 
the ownership structure of Japanese firms.  One view is that shareholding by stable 
shareholders, banks, and nonfinancial companies has a positive effect on corporate performance.  
For instance, the literature on Japanese corporate governance often argues that stable 
shareholding enables management to adopt a long-term perspective or at least contributes to 
high growth by mitigating the threat of hostile takeovers and myopic pressure from shareholders 
exerted through such means as claims for dividends (Abegglen and Stalk 1985, Porter 1992, 1994, 
and Odagiri 1992).  In addition, shareholding by banks has a disciplinary effect on corporate 
management by facilitating monitoring of the borrower and reducing increases in asset substitution 
(Prowse 1992 and Aoki and Patrick 1994).  Moreover, shareholding by nonfinancial companies 
provides an incentive to monitor affiliated companies, which raises management efficiency (Sheard 
1994).  In sum, it has been understood that main banks and nonfinancial companies play a role as 
delegated monitors for minority shareholders. 
However, shareholding by stable shareholder, banks, and nonfinancial companies may 
potentially have a negative effect on corporate performance.  For instance, a high ratio of 
stable shareholding enabled managers to seek private benefits by securing excessive autonomy, 
with negative effects on corporate performance (Morck et al. 2005).  In addition, as for 
shareholding by banks, researchers have focused attention on the negative aspects in recent years.  
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) indicate that the bank imposes a high capital cost on the borrower by 
                                                  
26 The setting of this threshold is the same as in Miyajima and Kuroki (2007). 
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utilizing its dominant bargaining position27.  Morck, Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000) suggest that 
the bank’s role in corporate governance doesn't necessarily lead to corporate value maximization 
because the bank’s role as shareholder does not correspond to its role as creditor.  Furthermore, as 
for shareholding by nonfinancial companies, recent studies focus on the potential deprivation of 
minority shareholders by the predominant shareholder (parent company), and this suggests that 
corporate performance is low when nonfinancial shareholders own a large percentage of shares 
(Classen, Djankow, Fan and Lang. 2001, Morck, Wofenzon and Yeung 2005). 
In the estimation, to control for the effects of affiliation to a corporate group, we 
introduce the corporate group dummy variable KEIRETSU that takes the value of one if the 
sample firm belongs to the presidents’ clubs (Shacho-kai) of the six corporate groups (Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa and Daiichi-Kangin)28.  The ratios of the firms belonging 
to the corporate groups in the sample are 8.6 percent in 1959, 18.3 percent in 1974, and 23.2 
percent in 1984.29 
 
Estimation Results 
The estimation results introducing ownership structure variables are summarized in Table 6.  
Though we estimated the model that changed the dependent variable into ROE and the growth 
rate of total assets, we avoid fully reporting the results in the interests of brevity.  The 
following results were obtained.  
------------------------------------------------- 
    INSERT Table 6 ABOUT HERE 
     ------------------------------------------------- 
(1)  In the high-growth era (1960-1964), the coefficient of γ is not significant but 
negative (column 1).  This insignificant result is similar even if the dependent variable is 
changed to the asset growth rate, and we can not obtain significant effects on corporate 
performance.  The affiliation to a corporate group also does not have a significant effect on 
                                                  
27 The banks have an incentive to lend excessively to borrower and to influence borrowers to select 
overly conservative investment projects. 
28 The presidents’ clubs (Shacho-kai) are composed of the presidents of the core companies of each 
corporate group. 
29 The presidents’ clubs (Shacho-kai) exist only for the Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo groups in 
1960. It was the early 1970s that six bank centered corporate groups organized their president clubs. 
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both ROE and the asset growth rate (column 2).  On the other hand, the coefficient of BSH 
(the ownership ratio held by the bank) is significantly negative at the 1 percent level, though 
the coefficient of MBSH (the ownership ratio held by the main bank) is not significant but 
negative (column 3).  Except for ownership by a nonfinancial company, the ownership 
structure doesn’t have a positive effect on corporate performance in the first half of the 
high-growth era30.  We could not find evidence that the insider ownership that appeared in 
this period contributed to high performance and high growth, this result is basically same as 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), who stressed that corporate group have not shown any positive 
effect on performance and firm’s growth rate. 
(2) The coefficient of γ is not significant but positive after the oil crises.  The coefficient 
of KEIRETSU is also not significant (column 4).  However, the coefficient of BSH is 
significantly positive (column 5) and the coefficient of MBSH is also positive though the 
significance level is slightly low (column 6).  Since an increase by one standard deviation of 
BSH boosts ROA by 0.3 percentage points, its economic magnitude is not small.  This result 
indicates that the contingent governance mechanism that was developed by banks to exert 
managerial discipline on borrower firms  becomes functional after the oil crises. The positive 
role of main bank suggested by Aoki and Patrick (1994) and Sheard (1994) was typically the 
case in this phase. 
(3) In the bubble period, the coefficient of γ is not significant (column 7).  However, the 
coefficient of KEIRETSU is significantly negative in all models (column 7-9).  This result is 
similar even if the dependent variable is changed to the asset growth rate (not reported).  In 
contrast, it is notable that the coefficient of BSH turned negative in the bubble period (column 
8).  An increase of one standard deviation of BSH decreases ROA by 0.5 percent 
(approximately 10 percent of average ROA in the bubble period).  The coefficient of MBSH is 
also negative (column 9). We found that the function of shareholding by banks during the 
bubble period underwent a change, and its negative effects were enhanced.31  
(4) The above-mentioned feature becomes clearer after the collapse of the bubble 
                                                  
30 The significantly negative coefficients of BSH and MBSH may reflect the fact that the bank increased 
shareholding in firms that faced declines in performance (Franks, Mayer and Miyajima 2008). An 
examination of this inverse relationship is part of our future research agenda. 
31 Miyajima, Arikawa and Saito (2001) report that firms with strong main bank ties is likely to overly 
invest during the late 1980s, estimating standard investment function with cash flow. 
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economy.  The coefficient of γ is significantly negative in the estimation after the collapse of 
the bubble economy (column 10).  Its economic magnitude is 0.2 percent as measured by an 
increase of one standard deviation.  In addition, the sign of NBSH is negative though its 
significance level is not sufficiently high. Moreover, the coefficient of KEIRETSU is also 
significantly negative and its magnitude is 0.6 percent (columns 10-12)32.  This result 
indicates that stable shareholding promoted managerial entrenchment and the cost of stable 
shareholding became evident from the early 1990s.33 
In sum, it could be the bubble and after bubble phases that the dark side of bank 
ownership emphasized by Morck and Nakamura (1999) and others was the case. 
(5) Although the function of stable shareholding and shareholding by banks has changed 
through the four stages of the 20th century, shareholding by nonfinancial companies has had a 
consistently positive effect on corporate performance.  For instance, the ROA of firms with 
large nonfinancial corporate shareholders is 1.7-2.0 percent higher in the high-growth era and 
0.5-0.6 percent higher in the bubble period than the ROA of firms without large nonfinancial 
corporate shareholders.  This result is consistent with Yafeh and Yosha (2003), which focused 
on advertisement and entertainment expenditures.  This indicates that the deprivation of 
minority shareholders, which many researchers have given attention to, is not a serious 
problem in Japan at least until the first half of the 1990s.  In fact, we can assert that a 
pyramid-type organization in which the corporate shareholder (parent company) served as the 
largest shareholder contributed to the improved performance of affiliated companies under its 
umbrella34. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the effect that governance structures have on corporate 
performance using our newly constructed corporate database for 20th century Japan.  The 
conclusion and implications obtained from the analysis in this paper are summarized as 
                                                  
32 When the explanatory variable is changed to the asset growth rate, the asset growth rate is not 
sensitive to both MBSH and the KEIRETSU dummy. 
33 Miyajima and Kuroki (2007) found a significantly negative relationship betweenγ and corporate 
performance in the latter half of the 1990s. 
34 This effect may indicate not only a monitoring effect of large shareholders but also the effect of a 
long-term transactional relationship between parent company and subsidiaries.  
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follows. 
The salient feature of the ownership structure of Japanese firms in the prewar period was 
that highly concentrated firms coexisted alongside widely held firms.  Under such a structure, 
large shareholders comprised of individuals, holding companies, and corporate had a 
significant effect on both ROE and the total asset growth rate.  In addition, as for ownership 
by large shareholders, there is a nonlinear relationship between large shareholders and 
corporate performance.  The increase in ownership by large shareholders contributed to the 
improvement of corporate performance up to a certain threshold, and then decreased corporate 
performance after the threshold was exceeded.  On the other hand, we found a nonlinear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.  This result indicates that 
managerial ownership had two conflicting effects, namely the alignment effect that mitigated 
conflicts between shareholders and managers, and the entrenchment effect that shielded 
management from interference by outsiders.  
Japanese firms in the latter half of the 20th century can be characterized as having a 
dispersed ownership structure that promoted cooperation between incumbent managers, and 
the banks, insurance companies, and nonfinancial corporations that had long-term business 
relations with the firm.  In this ownership structure, stable shareholding did not have a 
positive effect on corporate performance for most of the postwar period, and it has had a 
negative effect on corporate performance after the bubble period.  In other words, stable 
shareholding had a neutral effect on corporate performance during the growth stage, and 
enabled managers to deviate from value maximization behavior from the 1980s as the Japanese 
economy entered into mature stage.35 
By contrast, shareholding by banks had dual effects in accordance with the stage of 
growth of the overall economy.  In the period after the oil crises, as the number of firms that 
faced financial difficulties increased, shareholding by banks disciplined corporate management 
                                                  
35 This result is consistent to the comparison of the results of fixed effects with pooled OLS estimation 
in Table 5. The R-squared of the fixed effects estimation falls below the R-squared of the pooled OLS 
estimations by the Oil crisis period.  However, since the bubble period, the R-squared of the fixed 
effects estimation exceeds that of the pooled OLS estimation.  If a firm’s fixed effect contains an 
ownership structure effect that doesn’t fluctuate widely in the short term, we would expect that 
ownership structure has less impact on corporate performance in the high-growth era and a significant 
impact on it from the bubble period.  
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and contributed to an increase in corporate performance.  However, shareholding by banks 
has had an increasingly negative effect from the 1980s.  The period in which shareholding by 
banks had a positive effect was limited to a short window of time after the oil crises.  
Shareholding by nonfinancial companies had a positive effect on corporate performance 
consistently throughout the postwar period.  Although this positive effect cannot be attributed 
solely to the monitoring role performed by the largest shareholders, the existence of 
nonfinancial companies as large shareholders has been a feature of companies listed on the 
stock market in postwar Japan. Analyzing the causes behind this phenomenon is one of our 
future research aims.  
These Japanese experiences suggest that ownership structure influences corporate 
performance but not necessarily on a consistent basis. Under the open economy of the prewar 
period, corporate performance was sensitive not only to demand factors but also to price 
factors, and was also influenced by ownership structure.  During the interwar period, and 
especially during the period of the Showa depression and subsequent economic recovery, the 
ownership structure was an important determinant of corporate performance.  By contrast, in 
the high-growth era and after the oil crises when corporate performance was sensitive to 
demand fluctuation and industry characteristics ownership structure also influenced corporate 
performance, but to a much smaller degree than in the prewar period. Ownership structure was 
not an important determinant of corporate performance over time.  In postwar period, even 
when a positive effect appeared, it was limited to the recession period (following the oil crisis).  
On the other hand, corporate performance grew more sensitive to ownership structure, in the 
bubble period and after the collapse of the bubble, as the negative effects of stable 
shareholding and shareholding by banks became apparent.  In other words, the experience of 
Japanese firms through the 20th century suggests that a certain ownership structure does not 
necessarily have a positive effect on corporate performance, and the function of ownership 
structure is dependent on the economic cycle and growth stage of the economy. 
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Figure 1  The Trend of ROE in the 20th century 
 
This graph displays trends in the mean and standard deviation of ROE of large Japanese corporations in the 20th century. The three-year moving average of 
ROE is used. Observations of ROE that are more than three standard deviations from the mean are dropped have been dropped from the sample. The Prewar 
Sample is for 1915-41. The Bridge Sample (126 firms) is used for 1951-1960. The Postwar Sample is for 1957-1999. These samples are defined in Table 1. 
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Figure 2  Trend of ROA in the 20th century 
 
This graph displays trends in the mean and standard deviation of ROA of large Japanese corporations after 1950. The Bridge Sample (126 firms) is used for 
1950-1960. The Postwar Sample is used for 1956-1998. These samples are defined in Table 1. 
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Figure 3  Growth rate of Total Assets in the 20th century 
 
This graph displays trends in the mean and standard deviation of the growth rate of total assets of large Japanese corporations in the 20th century. The 
three-year moving average of total asset value is used. Observations of the growth rate of total assets more than three standard deviations from the mean are 
dropped from the sample. The Prewar Sample is used for 1916-41. The Bridge Sample (126 firms) is used for 1952-1960. The postwar Sample is used for 
1958-1999. These samples are defined in Table 1. 
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Figure 4  Ownership Structure in the 20th 
 
This graph displays trends in shareholding ratios by type of shareholders in the late 20th century. The insider shareholding ratio is defined as the 
shareholding ratios of financial institutions + corporations – investment trusts + foreign corporations + managers. The bank shareholding ratio is defined as 
the shareholding ratios of financial institutions – investment trusts – insurance companies. The corporation shareholding ratio is defined as shareholding 
ratio by “other corporations” on financial statements. Sample firms are taken from the Postwar Sample as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 1  Summary of the Database 
 
Period Number of Firms Sample Selection Method Data Source
Prewar Sample 1914-42 102 in 1920, 188 in1928, 256 in 1933
Sample includes mining and
manufacturing firms in the list of top
200 firms in terms of total assets in
the years 1918, 1930, or 1937.
Honpo Jigyo Seiseki Bunseki  (The
Mitsubishi Economic Research
Institute), Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan
(Toyo Keizai), company histories
and business reports of the sample
firms
Bridge Sample 1930-80 126
Sample includes 126 firms ranked
among the top 100 firms in terms of
total assets either in 1937 or 1955
and which survived into the postwar
period.
Jojo Gaisha Soran  (Tokyo Stock
Exchange)
Postwar Sample 1956-99 159 in 1959, 337 in1974, 349 in 1984
Sample includes 353 listed
manufacturing firms with sales
greater than 50 billion yen in 1990
excluding mining firms.
"Corporate Finance Data"
(Development Bank of Japan)
Ownership
Structure 1921-2000 45 (38 in 1907)
Among the prewar sample, we pick
up 68 firms which ownership
structure data is available prewar
period. This sample firms were
established before 1920 and survived
until 2000.
Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan  (Toyo
Keizai), Annual Corporation Reports
(Nikkei), and business report of the
sample firms, see Franks, Mayer and
Miyajima (2008)
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Table 2  The trend of Ownership Structure in the 20th century 
 
This table presents trends in percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders, C3, from 1907 
to 2000. It uses the ownership structure sample defined in Table 1, which consists of 68 firms which 
existed before 1920 and survived until 2000. The sample size is 38 in 1907 and 45 in 1914. 
 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile
1907 25.9% 18.3% 18.9% 12.0% 37.1%
1914 32.0% 24.1% 23.8% 13.4% 48.4%
1921 29.2% 24.8% 21.3% 11.1% 38.2%
1928 27.2% 25.2% 18.1% 10.2% 30.6%
1933 25.7% 22.3% 17.5% 11.0% 29.7%
1937 25.9% 21.4% 18.0% 11.4% 34.4%
1950 8.3% 7.3% 6.3% 3.9% 9.2%
1960 16.5% 12.8% 12.4% 8.8% 17.6%
1970 19.0% 13.0% 16.4% 11.7% 22.0%
1982 19.3% 9.0% 16.5% 13.7% 22.1%
1990 17.3% 7.4% 15.5% 13.7% 18.3%
2000 16.7% 9.0% 14.8% 12.7% 16.3%  
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Table 3  Determinants of Corporate Performance in the Interwar Period 
 
This table shows regression results of the base estimation, using the Prewar Sample as defined in Table 1. The dependent variable is corporate performance 
measured by ROE. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. S is the growth rate in industry level real sales deflated with “Total Deflator” of “National 
Income” (Okawa estimation) in Major Domestic Economic Statistics since the Meiji Period (CD-ROM version), edited by the Bank of Japan’s Statistics 
Department. ∆P is the change in the industry price index constructed from Ohkawa Kazushi ,et al. (1967), Long-term Economic Statistics, Vol. 8. Prices. 
Toyo-Keizai. GDP is the real GDP growth rate obtained from Maddison (2001), The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. (Development Centre of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).  DA is the leverage defined by debt to assets ratio (debt / total assets). Industry dummies 
are also included.  Observations with ROE or DA more than three standard deviations from the mean values are dropped from the sample. The columns (1), 
(2), and (3) present the OLS estimates for time periods 1921-37, 1921-32, and 1928-37, respectively (pooled regression). The t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Period 1921-37 1921-32 1928-37
Column (1) (2) (3)
SIZE 0.008 0.011 0.005
(5.14)*** (5.11)*** (2.83)***
? S 0.145 0.155 0.143
(9.79)*** (6.98)*** (8.78)***
?P 0.061 0.058 0.083
(5.19)*** (3.14)*** (5.86)***
?GDP 0.229 0.289 0.181
(5.89)*** (6.03)*** (4.06)***
DA -0.112 -0.137 -0.098
(12.86)*** (11.63)*** (10.57)***
Constant -0.003 -0.039 0.031
(0.20) (1.69)* (1.82)*
Number of industries which
have significant coefficients 8 8 3
Observations 2473 1509 1805
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19  
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Table 4  The Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance in the Interwar Period 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in the prewar period by using the Prewar 
Sample as defined in Table 1. In the odd numbered columns the dependent variables are ROE.  In the even numbered columns the dependent variables are 
∆A, that is the growth rate of total assets. α is the holding ratio of the largest shareholder excluding managers. Corp-α is the holding ratio of the largest 
shareholder when it is a corporate shareholder. Ind-α is the holding ratio of the largest shareholder when it is an individual shareholder. α2 is square of α. ω 
is the holding ratio of managers. ω2 is the square of ω. OLD is a dummy variable which takes one if a firm is a member of big three zaibatsu (Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo). All the other variables are defined in Table 3. Industry dummies are also included. Observations with ROE, ∆A or DA more 
than three standard deviations from the mean values are dropped from the sample. The columns (1)-(6) present the OLS estimates for the time period 
1921-37 (pooled regression). The columns (7)-(8) present the OLS estimates for the time period 1921-32 (pooled regression). The columns (9)-(10) present 
the OLS estimates for the time period 1928-37 (pooled regression). The t-statistics are reported in brackets. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Period 1921-37 1921-37 1921-37 1921-37 1921-37 1921-37 1921-32 1921-32 1928-37 1928-37
Dep. Var. ROE ?A ROE ?A ROE ?A ROE ?A ROE ?A
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
α 0.031 0.035 0.105 0.149 0.096 0.017 0.108 0.206
(3.68)*** (1.48) (4.52)*** (2.33)** (2.96)*** (0.28) (4.29)*** (2.72)***
Corp-α 0.029 0.053
(3.56)*** (2.37)**
Ind-α -0.003 -0.055
(0.16) (1.28)
α2 -0.085 -0.126 -0.086 -0.051 -0.087 -0.157
(3.29)*** (1.78)* (2.34)** (0.75) (3.14)*** (1.86)*
ω -0.003 0.059 0.083 0.327 -0.004 0.065 0.064 0.099 0.087 0.409
(0.26) (1.59) (2.70)*** (3.88)*** (0.33) (1.78)* (1.58) (1.31) (2.66)*** (4.12)***
ω2 -0.132 -0.421 -0.086 -0.155 -0.130 -0.473
(2.99)*** (3.47)*** (1.57) (1.52) (2.90)*** (3.48)***
OLD -0.014 0.002 -0.008 0.009 -0.010 0.007 -0.011 0.019 -0.007 0.011
(1.78)* (0.08) (1.04) (0.43) (1.23) (0.33) (1.00) (0.91) (0.81) (0.41)
SIZE 0.008 -0.007 0.009 -0.005 0.007 -0.009 0.013 -0.009 0.006 0.000
(5.34)*** (1.63) (5.90)*** (1.20) (4.73)*** (2.11)** (5.67)*** (2.24)** (3.68)*** (0.06)
? S 0.143 0.180 0.144 0.182 0.144 0.181 0.153 0.212 0.144 0.094
(9.77)*** (4.48)*** (9.87)*** (4.54)*** (9.81)*** (4.51)*** (6.93)*** (5.13)*** (8.91)*** (1.93)*
?P 0.061 0.425 0.059 0.421 0.061 0.424 0.058 0.092 0.081 0.642
(5.24)*** (13.32)*** (5.11)*** (13.24)*** (5.23)*** (13.29)*** (3.15)*** (2.68)*** (5.77)*** (15.09)***
?GDP 0.222 -0.054 0.224 -0.049 0.223 -0.056 0.286 0.295 0.178 -0.574
(5.73)*** (0.51) (5.80)*** (0.47) (5.74)*** (0.53) (5.98)*** (3.31)*** (4.02)*** (4.29)***
DA -0.116 -0.070 -0.117 -0.072 -0.115 -0.069 -0.142 -0.077 -0.103 -0.061
(13.19)*** (2.93)*** (13.36)*** (3.02)*** (13.06)*** (2.87)*** (11.92)*** (3.46)*** (11.01)*** (2.14)**
Constant -0.018 0.111 -0.035 0.079 -0.010 0.125 -0.067 0.124 -0.002 0.033
(1.06) (2.40)** (2.01)** (1.66)* (0.59) (2.69)*** (2.72)*** (2.68)*** (0.13) (0.59)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2473 2473 2473 2473 2473 2473 1509 1509 1805 1805
R-squared 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.18
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Table 5  Corporate Performance (ROA) in the latter half of 20th Century 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates on the determinants of corporate performance in the postwar period by using the Postwar Sample as defined in 
Table 1.  The dependent variable is corporate performance measured by ROA. S is the growth rate in industry level real sales deflated with the GDP 
deflator for “SNA (System of National Account)” released on the website of the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. P is the growth rate in industry 
price index constructed from “Prewar Base Index” on the Bank of Japan website for the 1960-64 estimation, and for the later periods “Price Index Annual 
Report” by the Bank of Japan and “Price Index Monthly” on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications are used. All the other 
variables are defined in Table 3. Industry dummies are also included. The columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) present the OLS estimates for the time periods 
1960-64, 1975-79, 1985-89, and 1990-94, respectively (pooled regression). The t-statistics are reported in brackets. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Period 1960-64 1975-79 1985-89 1990-94
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
SIZE -0.007 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(5.52)*** (3.76)*** (0.28) (0.39)
? S 0.117 0.086 0.140 0.095
(5.76)*** (3.76)*** (4.43)*** (4.12)***
?P -0.007 -0.012 -0.010 0.100
(0.11) (0.43) (0.23) (1.53)
?GDP 0.119 0.609 -0.096 0.375
(1.47) (4.12)*** (0.66) (5.16)***
DA -0.196 -0.132 -0.081 -0.039
(13.90)*** (18.11)*** (15.34)*** (7.92)***
Constant 0.257 0.155 0.110 0.049
(14.07)*** (11.94)*** (8.81)*** (4.71)***
Number of industries which
have significant coefficients 8 8 8 3
Observations 815 1557 1631 1542
R-squared 0.41 0.33 0.22 0.25  
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Table 6  The Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Performance in the latter half of 20th century 
 
This table presents the OLS estimates of the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in the late 20th century by using the 
Postwar Sample as defined in Table 1. The dependent variable is corporate performance measured by rate of return on assets, ROA.  The γ is the holding 
ratio of insiders defined as shareholdings ratio of financial institutions + corporations – investment trusts + foreign corporations + managers. BSH is the 
holding ratio of banks defined as shareholding ratio by financial institutions – investment trusts – insurance companies. MBSH is the holding ratio of the 
main banks. Main banks are identified from the “largest lender” in Quarterly Corporate Report [Kaisha Shiki Ho] by Toyo-Keizai.  PARENT is a dummy 
variable which takes one if the largest shareholder is a corporation holding more than 15% of the shares.  KEIRETSU is a dummy variable which takes one 
if a firm is a member of one of the big six zaibatsu presidents’ clubs at the beginning of the estimation period. All the other variables are defined in Table 5. 
Industry dummies are also included. The columns (1)-(3), (4)-(6), (7)-(9) and (10)-(12) present the OLS estimates for the time period 1960-64,1975-79, 
1985-89 and 1990-94 (pooled regression) respectively. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. *,**, and *** mean significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Period
Av. ROA 0.094 0.066 0.050 0.032
Std. Dev. 0.047 0.046 0.038 0.035
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
γ -0.001 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.006 -0.019 -0.020
(0.12) (0.29) (1.20) (0.93) (0.54) (0.62) (2.14)** (2.26)**
BSH -0.047 0.030 -0.058 -0.008
(2.90)*** (2.19)** (4.10)*** (0.68)
NBSH 0.030 0.014 0.011 -0.013
(3.15)*** (1.88)* (1.37) (1.59)
MBSH -0.074 0.050 -0.051 0.093
(1.51) (1.31) (1.01) (1.13)
PARENT 0.020 0.017 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006
(3.91)*** (3.35)*** (1.51) (1.83)* (2.44)** (1.95)* (2.08)** (2.37)**
KEIRETSU -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.20) (0.94) (0.19) (0.41) (0.47) (0.66) (2.92)*** (3.20)*** (2.77)*** (2.56)** (2.79)*** (2.68)***
SIZE -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(4.13)*** (3.08)*** (4.31)*** (2.54)** (3.25)*** (2.40)** (2.21)** (3.78)*** (2.01)** (1.17) (0.68) (1.35)
? S 0.120 0.124 0.121 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.140 0.138 0.140 0.096 0.096 0.096
(5.95)*** (6.18)*** (5.99)*** (3.76)*** (3.77)*** (3.77)*** (4.44)*** (4.41)*** (4.43)*** (4.19)*** (4.17)*** (4.19)***
?P -0.013 -0.022 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 -0.013 0.100 0.100 0.100
(0.21) (0.35) (0.22) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.31) (0.35) (0.30) (1.53) (1.53) (1.53)
?GDP 0.130 0.135 0.128 0.600 0.610 0.600 -0.099 -0.093 -0.097 0.374 0.374 0.374
(1.64) (1.70)* (1.60) (4.06)*** (4.13)*** (4.06)*** (0.69) (0.65) (0.67) (5.16)*** (5.16)*** (5.17)***
DA -0.201 -0.203 -0.201 -0.134 -0.131 -0.134 -0.078 -0.082 -0.078 -0.035 -0.036 -0.036
(14.30)*** (14.51)*** (14.33)*** (18.17)*** (17.71)*** (18.14)*** (14.42)*** (15.32)*** (14.31)*** (6.97)*** (6.99)*** (7.03)***
Constant 0.243 0.239 0.247 0.143 0.144 0.140 0.079 0.076 0.082 0.042 0.044 0.037
(12.65)*** (12.43)*** (12.75)*** (9.74)*** (9.83)*** (9.42)*** (5.30)*** (5.15)*** (5.39)*** (3.27)*** (3.36)*** (2.70)***
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 815 815 815 1557 1557 1557 1631 1631 1631 1542 1542 1542
R-squared 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26
1990-941985-891975-791960-64
 
